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Death is the end – not of any life – but at least of every human life. Most theories of 
death agree on this definition. Moreover, due to the fact that human beings are living 
things, it seems obvious that their lives and deaths must be described in terms of 
biological processes. But this widespread position raises serious problems in view 
of the determination of a comprehensive and adequate concept of human death and 
of the normative evaluation and judgment of how we should appropriately deal with 
brain-dead or human remains. In the first part of my article, I will argue that human 
death is not primarily an issue of biology. What characterizes a human being is that 
he or she is part of a specific interpersonal ‘life-form’, a ‘Lebensform’ (Plessner), 
which must be primarily represented by concepts of Practical Philosophy. This 
practical approach I will outline in the second part and show the connection of the 
concept of ‘life-form’ with those of a person and accordingly a personal death. In 
the third part I want to demonstrate how this approach might provide an adequate 
understanding of human death that leads to coherent solutions of current questions 
of ethics, such as the determination of a criterion for the explantation of organs. 
Death is the end – not of any life – but at least of every human life. Most theories 
of death agree on this definition. Moreover, due to the fact that human beings are 
living beings and organisms, it seems obvious that their lives and deaths must 
consequently be described in terms of biological and organic processes. Many 
theories of death as well as of Applied Ethics commonly take this for granted and 
state that life and death are primarily concepts of biology and, therefore, it is above 
all an issue of biology to formulate criteria for determining when human beings are 
dead.1 As some theories recently argue, the phenomenon of ‘brain-dead’ people 
shows quite clearly that biological concepts capture the determination of death more 
suitable than those that define death as the end of life: Death and dying are better 
understood as continuously performed crossings and procedural transformations 
1 Cf. e.g. Birnbacher 2012; Stoecker 2010; Quante 2002; Lamb 1985; Olson 1997; DeGrazia 
1999.
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than in terms of the contradictory relationship in which life and death are placed 
in traditional definitions. Therefore it seems reasonable to rethink this traditional 
understanding and possibly abandon it or at least modify it.2 This consideration 
has stimulated serious controversies in academic as well as in public debates.3 
In addition, it has raised the question whether it might be necessary – at least in 
some contexts – to look for a ‘third category’4 of description that lies beyond life and 
death. This third category could be useful to grasp the very forms of transition from 
life to death existing for instance in the cases of brain-dead people. 
However, as much as this solution might be convincing at first sight, it raises 
serious problems concerning:
(1) the determination of a comprehensive and adequate understanding of 
human death that also accounts for the specific anthropological dimensions 
of human existence and 
(2) the normative, i.e. the ethical and juridical, evaluation and judgment of how 
we should appropriately deal with brain-dead donors of organs or human 
remains (such as corpses).
In the first part of my text I will outline these problems and then challenge the 
position that death and life are primarily biological concepts. At the end of part I 
will arrive at the conclusion that there is no need to establish a third category and 
above all that it is not possible. Instead I will argue that human death is not even 
primarily an issue of biology. A human being cannot be appropriately defined as 
“animal plus a certain capacity or feature (like language, thought or reflection)”5 just 
as an animal cannot be defined as “plant plus e.g. the capacity of movement”.6 What 
characterizes a human being cannot be expressed in such an ‘additive model’ of 
properties; human beings rather perform a specific ‘life-form’ – a ‘Lebensform’ as 
2 For instance, Birnbacher 2012, 4–5; Stoecker 2010, 46, 55; Quante 2002, 127 et seq.
3 Ibid.
4 Cf. Stoecker 2012, 9; cf. Schüle 2012.
5 Cf. Cassirer 2010 (1923).
6 See Gutmann 2008. In contrast to such an “additive“ and feature-orientated classification of 
living beings, as it was already entertained by Aristotle and is still widely applied in the current 
discussion, Cassirer and Plessner develop an activity-theoretical understanding of life, which here is 
designated with the term “life-form”. Unlike Gutmann in his interpretation (in Gutmann 2008), I delete 
the originary practical character from this conception. Thus, it is not primarily the fact of “having a 
language” which constitutes the transformation into a specific life-form, but the specifically practical 
use of language, i. e. the use of language as (?) subject to moral requirements. The possibility of the 
practical use of language, however, from this perspective would not be added as a further feature 
or a further ability to the other features thus marking the specific difference of a species. It rather 
marks the peculiarities that can be reconstructed in order to indicate the qualitative transformation of 
beings that are unable to entertain any practical life-forms into ones that can engage in relationships 
of mutual obligation and appreciation. In contrast to the life-scientific description the activity-
theoretical reformulation of the transition comprises a statement about the particular kind of speech 
ability as well as a determination of the way in which the indication of properties is relevant in terms 
of life science in the anthropological and life-world context. 
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Plessner formulates it: They lead their lives.7 The respective constitutive structures 
of these ‘life-forms’ must be primarily represented by concepts of Practical 
Philosophy and these ‘life-forms’ are therefore basically subject to normative 
standards. Hence, human death is the end of this very ‘life-form’ and is first of all a 
practical matter of fact.8 Because of this practical dimension the concept of human 
death is always to be judged as a personal death too and is to be connected with 
the normative concepts of a person. I will try to outline this practical approach to 
human life and death in the second part of my article. In the third part I will suggest 
that this approach might provide an adequate concept of death, leading to coherent 
solutions of current questions of ethics, such as the determination of a criterion for 
death or the explantation of organs. 
In reference to the outline of my text I would like to point out that already 
the understanding of the general concepts produces immediate consequences 
for concrete social practices and is by no means merely a descriptive issue of 
‘theoretical’ philosophy. Considering the current German (and in large part also 
international) transplantation practice, it can be observed that the so-called dead-
donor rule (DDR) plays an important normative role and thus ties this practice 
to general convictions about death. This is because the DDR stipulates that 
organs may be removed only from dead people but not from people who are still 
living. It formulates a conviction that is contained in nearly all established legal 
systems, namely that the distinction between living people and dead people should 
entail decisive differences in practice and in the moral and legal judgment. It is 
true that according to this conviction, for instance the bodies or bodily remains 
of deceased people are also under certain legal protection, but to a far lesser 
extent than is the living human body. Depending on the outcome of the judgment 
for instance brain-dead people can be considered to be dying and thus living, or 
as dead people, or as being in an “intermediate realm’9 between life and death. 
Accordingly a different medical and social way of dealing with the body must be 
considered to be legitimate or justified in each case. The German Transplant Act 
7 Cf. Plessner 2003 (1928).
8 Practical here is not meant in the sense of “pragmatic”, but in the sense of formal, moral-practical 
argumentation. Already the determination of what is human is not performed via the determination of 
properties and competences of individual specimens but by referring to the possibility of engaging 
in living relationships. The performances on their own are subject to moral or legal conditions (that 
formally restrict all further practices of acting) and constitute a “life-form”. Against this backround 
then also the end of this life-form is to be determined in moral-practical reasoning or also the 
criteria for determining the end of this life-form are of a primarily moral-practical nature. These, of 
course, can equally determine certain physiological states or the presence or loss as criteria for the 
determination of the end of the human life-form. Nevertheless, the reasons here do not lie in the 
presence or loss of the respective ability, but in the significance that is attributed to it with regard to 
the human life-form.
9 Cf. Denkhaus & Dabrock 2012, 135–148, 142. 
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(Deutsches Transplantationsgesetz (TPG)10 for instance regards it as the duty of 
medical science and its state of research to determine the concept of death. The 
concretization within the scope of the merely formal DDR necessarily remains 
open. To put it in more concrete terms, even though the establishing of the criteria 
of death as well as the determination of the conditions and methods of applying 
the respective criteria are based upon normative convictions about human life and 
human existence, these criteria are primarily justified within the scope of moral or 
legal-ethical argumentations.
The reference made by the German Transplant Act to the role of medicine and 
scientific research is substantiated by an argumentation which recently has been 
applied in the public and current scientific repeatedly. Frequently, in this discussion 
the view is taken that a distinction needs to be made between the determination of 
facts – i.e. a descriptive attribution of death that is exclusively based on scientific 
concepts – and the evaluation of what then, i.e. after and subsequent to the 
determination of the facts, is allowed or imperative under legal and moral, i.e. 
normative aspects. 
The implied suggestion that the determination of death, as it is made a condition 
in the DDR, is a matter of science and represents a fact in public debates and also 
amongst those members of the public who deal with the problem of what decision 
to make with regard to organ donation, leads to serious confusion: At least in terms 
of language, but at times also conceptually, the insight that death is in every respect 
a normative concept is again obscured.11 For this reason, major consequences 
evolve concerning how one deals with the question whether it might be reasonable 
and ethically justifiable to abandon the DDR and replace the condition of death with 
other conditions (such as non-heart-beating, anencephaly,12 irreversible deficiency 
of only certain parts of the brain, etc.) on which the removal of organs is permitted. 
And it equally affects practice, in which particular way the concept of ‘death’ is 
defined and how we relate the concepts of life and death to each other. 
10 The German Transplant Act (Deutsches Transplantationsgesetz (TPG)), latest amendment by 
law of July 15, 2013 (Federal German Law Gazette I, p. 2423) effective from August 1st, 2013, cf. 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/tpg/gesamt.pdf  (visited January 17, 2015): “(1) The 
removal of organs or tissue, unless deviating provisions are made in §4 or §4a, is only admissible if 
(1) the death of the organ or tissue donor is determined according to the rules corresponding to the 
state of knowledge in medical science…” 
11 Talking of “death”, as Rosenberg (1998) has already clearly demonstrated, suggests the idea of 
an incident which is unshakably cast in stone. Its determination is entirely independent of normative 
aspects. Equally problematic, not only in terms of language but also conceptually, however, are 
equalizations of criteria with the facts. They are meant to determine as in the formulation “Brain 
death is death”, which is frequently put forward in discussions with respect to H. Angstwurm. With 
this equalization the dependency of death on criteria and the status of brain death as a criterion 
fades into the background. This makes it appear as if death or brain death were a fact that can 
be described in scientific terms and as if the criterion for determining this fact no longer had to be 
normatively justified, but first and foremost serves for the reliable determination of death. 
12 Anencephaly refers to a deformity of the newborn that is due to a neural tube defect in the 
brain region; the cranium and essential parts of the brain are missing or not fully developed, cf. 
Pschyrembel 1994, col. 1, 66. 
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Life and Death: Conceptual Status and Logical Relation 
The ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Debate on Brain Death 
Referring to differentiations made by James L. Bernat, Charles M. Culver and 
Bernard Gert, the Scientific Advisory Board of the German Medical Association 
(Bundesärztekammer) suggested and substantiated the following determination 
of human death in 1993: The death of a human being – just like the death of any 
other animate being – was defined as the end of the existence “as organism in its 
functional entirety”.13 The decisive criterion in judging whether or not this end has 
occurred should be the complete and irreversible failure of the entire brain. This 
criterion, the so-called ‘brain death criterion’ was adequate because ‘in biological 
terms’ with the failure of the brain the organism lost its independent existence and 
activity as a functional unity.14 The irreversible failure of all brain functions could 
be unambiguously ascertained in clinical test procedures (such as testing the brain 
stem reflexes, the so-called apnoea test, etc.) and therefore be regarded as “a safe 
sign of death”.15
This substantiation of the brain death criterion is still controversial amongst 
other reasons because it determines the organism as a ‘functional unity’ that has to 
perform an ‘integrative function’ and because it associates the brain exclusively with 
the control of this integrative performance. Objections against the conviction that the 
brain exclusively performs the integrative function of the organism were formulated 
as early as in the 1990s. In the United States most recently – in 2008 to be more 
precise – an official statement of the so-called ‘President’s Council’ was presented, 
in which this substantiation (the so-called ‘standard substantiation’) of the brain 
death criterion is challenged anew.16 In the declaration of the ‘President’s Council’, 
arguments are formulated that are based on neurological research in particular by 
Alan Shewmon. Shewmon in his studies verified that integrative functions, such as 
the regulation of the body temperature, wound healing, immune defense, and even 
growth and maturation, remain unaffected even beyond the total and irreversible 
failure of the entire brain activity, at least in some cases of patients who are brain-
dead. In some cases, a pregnancy could be continued despite the occurrence of 
a brain death, because modern medicine has succeeded in stabilizing brain-dead 
patients over an extended period of time.17 Following Shewmon’s argumentation 
it can therefore be concluded that the integration of the organism obviously is 
13 Cf. Wissenschaftlicher Beirat der Bundesärztekammer 1993, A-1861 / B-1601 / C-1485; cf. also 
Bernat, Culver & Gert 1981, 389–394, 390.
14 Cf. Collectif 1968. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Examine the 
Definition of Brain Death 1968, 85–88.
15 Ibid.
16 President’s Council on Bioethics 2008.
17 Shewmom 1998.
Andrea Marlen Esser
37
not exclusively performed by the brain. Against this background, though, not only 
the so-called standard substantiation of brain death starts to crumble but also 
the conviction that the organism upon the occurrence of brain death is dead in 
a biological sense: The organism very obviously does not lose its independent 
existence and activity as a functional unity upon failure of the brain’s activity. 
‘Life’ and ‘Vitality’ in the Biological Research Discourse
What does it mean within the context of biological research that an organism 
is dead or living? To answer this question I will take a short look at the current 
positions in biology and show how biological theories determine the two concepts, 
life and death. I want to point out that this is an ambitious procedure. In biological 
research the concept of life does not refer to life as opposed to death but to vitality 
in contrast to the inanimateness of lifeless things or matters. Ernst Mayr states 
that biology actually tries to find out what life is – not ‘in itself’ – yet how life can 
be captured with regard to and in contrast to inanimate things.18 Thus, the primary 
objective of any theoretical effort in biology is to mark a fundamental difference. 
But this difference – denoted by the concept of ‘life’ – is not generated by the 
existence of a ‘substance of life’ or a ‘vital force’ (Lebenskraft). The concept ‘life’ 
rather refers to specific processes that are performed by, and can be expected 
from living individuals.19 Biological theories, on the other hand, try to define 
the concept of life in a criteriological way that can be explained as follows: the 
specific processes performed by living individuals can be empirically observed. 
Subsequently, scientific observations allow us to abstract specific characteristics 
of these processes as criteria that are considered to be typical of animate things. 
These criteria can be summarized in a list. Even though not all of the listed criteria 
differentiate between animate and inanimate beings, the sum total of the respective 
criteria will be presented in such laws and regularities that can only be applied to 
animate things. Insofar they must be judged as typical of them.20 This procedure 
of attributing criteria allows us to single out animate beings as such. Moreover, 
the properties listed are complex properties like reproduction, metabolism, motion, 
motility and existence of a ‘genotype and phenotype’.21 
As a first result, we may now summarize: In the context of the biological 
language-game the predicate ‘life’ means ‘vitality’ and the predicate ‘living’ means 
‘animate’ and both are attributed in accordance with a list of complex properties 
or capacities.22 ‘Life’ therefore is a ‘meta-concept’ referring to the items on the 
18 Mayr 1998, 2.
19 Gutmann 2008, 74.
20 cf. Mayr 1998, 44f.
21 cf. Mayr 1998, pp. 44; Toepfer 2005, 164.
22 Mayr 1998, 47.
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list and not directly to a given phenomenon. This logical status analysis of the 
biological meaning of the terms, moreover, shows clearly that the usage of ‘vitality’ 
in the biological context must invariably be related to certain integrative units in 
each case and that this usage by no means prefers or prioritizes certain units. 
The classification as ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ integrative units is merely the outcome of 
referring to whole entities that – governed by the purpose of the examination in each 
case – can be determined at will. In this way the predicate ‘living’ in accordance 
with the sum of the items on the list can be attributed to certain integrative units of 
an organism even if this is no longer possible for a ‘higher’ integrative unit of the 
same specimen. On the basis of this method biological research can be conducted 
without having to answer the question of what is the ‘essence’ of the concepts life 
or living first.
But what if we want to know the biological meaning of death against this 
background? For one thing, we must be aware of the following: the attribution of 
‘not animate’ meaning ‘has died’ or ‘is dead’ in the biological language-game only 
makes sense in the following respect and on the following condition, namely some, 
all, or certain combinations of the items on the list can be assumed as fulfilled. 
That means, a ‘type’ that represents a certain species of animal (with its typical 
properties) must have already been generated, for instance: the ‘type’ oak (for the 
species Quercus). Even if this type does not show all features of the items on the 
list (like in the case of the type ‘oak’: mobility), the sum of the other items allows us 
to classify oaks in general as animate things. However, in respect of an individual 
‘token’ of this type (for instance: the individual oak) it is possible that the listed 
‘capacities’ can no longer be attributed or just in parts, or only gradually. Strictly 
speaking, the statement ‘x is dead’ in this method means: The integrative unit to 
which I refer with the corresponding statement in this case, does not fulfill or no 
longer fulfills the respective criteria for vitality. Applied to ‘brain-dead’ specimens of 
the species homo sapiens this method shows that to certain integrative units of the 
specimen in question in a biological sense ‘vitality’ can still be absolutely attributed, 
even if this is no longer possible with respect to the integrative unit of the brain.
What now becomes evident is that both the biological concept of vitality and the 
biological concept of death do not have the meanings we give them in our everyday 
communication; further, the biological meaning of these concepts is certainly not 
the one from which we may expect to obtain a solution in the current discussion of 
an adequate criterion for human death. In the context of the latter discussion the 
question is not at all at what point in time or under which conditions all vitality has 
disappeared from an organism, or under which condition certain, or actually all 
levels of integration are ‘dead’ in an organismic sense. Rather, what we derive from 
it are those conditions under which we should consider the life of a human being 
as having ended. 
However, this question cannot be answered at all in reference to the list model of 
biological research. This is because if we apply the biological method of attributing 
vitality, for instance, to a ‘brain-dead’ specimen of the species homo sapiens, it 
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means that in a biological sense this individual is not dead. In this specimen not only 
lower levels of integration would definitely still have to be referred to as living. Also 
the entire organism itself, insofar as the integrative performance of the organism 
can still be maintained even without brain activity, can still be qualified as living. 
Viewed in this light, the medical concept of brain death cannot be specified in more 
detail and precision by applying the biological understanding of the concepts of 
‘living’ and ‘dead’. This is because, used in the context of biological meaning, it 
merely indicates that a certain part but not ‘the’ integrative unit of a certain organism 
has died. 
Therefore, it is important to notice that in the case of the concepts of life 
and death we have to undertake a conceptual mediation between the biological 
language-game and other forms like the language-game of our everyday life and our 
discourse as well as in the actual debate about the criteria of death. In the biological 
language-game one has to abstract from the very procedural character of ‘life’. For 
an individual animal or animate thing which is part of our ‘lived’ experience, of our 
so-called ‘life-world’ or ‘Lebenswelt’, has to be described in the biological language-
game as a structured organic unity.23 This means that if a certain individual as a 
‘token’ falls under the ‘type’ of a species, then this token is exactly the structured 
organic unity (and nothing more) as determined by the biological classification. 
But within the biological language-game the concepts ‘animate’ or ‘vital’ can be 
attributed to the whole organism as well as to smallest unities like the individual 
cell in exactly the way characterized above. And this implies that for animate things 
it is still possible to attribute the term ‘vital’ or ‘animate’ to parts of them or to lower 
unities of their organization – even if in the case of higher unities this is no longer 
possible. Thus, saying that an individual organism is dead means that the unity of 
the organization in question no longer fulfills the relevant criteria of vitality. Hence, 
‘death’ in the context of biology is nothing more than the negation of the criteria on 
the list with regard to a token of a type and therefore is the contradictious concept in 
relation to life. The concept of death is therefore a ‘meta-concept’, too, for it refers 
to the items on the list just like the concept of life. As such, it is the contradictious 
negation of these items and the contradictious concept to the concept of life. 
This argument might sound somewhat complicated, but its results are – in 
the end – almost simple. First, the crucial point is that in order to define certain 
capacities and properties of life, biological research has to abstract intentionally 
from the very procedural character of ‘life’ – even if it is this process that we 
experience in our ‘Lebenswelt’ which is under scientific investigation. The same 
applies to the biological concept of death as the negation of life. Therefore, we 
can conclude: If it were correct that life and death are biological concepts, then 
they would precisely not be the ones to capture the procedural nature of life and 
death. For even within biological discourse they are terms that only mark the 
23 See Gutmann 2008, 77ff.
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contradictious logical extremes and therefore not the processes of continuously 
performed crossings or phased transformations. 
As far as those concepts stand in a contradictious relationship and can only be 
exclusively attributed via the procedure of an ascription described above, there is 
no logical space for any ‘third category’ beyond life and death, not even within the 
biological use of these concepts. 
Second, the term ‘life’ used in the biological language-game refers to a 
procedure of attributing a sum of properties and capacities. This implies that the 
term itself can be completely replaced by the very capacities and properties on 
the list. The biological concept of ‘life’ has to be considered a ‘meta-concept’ 
denoting a scientific procedure that works without this concept. The same applies 
to the biological concept of death as the negation of life. Therefore, the biological 
understanding of these two concepts provides manifold items and a plurality of life-
unities for us, but not practicable concepts of life and death that we could use to 
mark the very end of the unity of an individual human being.
And third: These results show that the conceptual procedures used to mark 
vital or animate things can be applied and are valid for all animate things. So the 
biological term ‘life’ as well as its negation (‘death’) do not aim at formulating criteria 
specific to human death nor do they lead to specific characteristics of human life. 
The concept of ‘life’ determines what can be classified as animate being. And with 
regard to an individual organic entity it helps to figure out whether or not it or parts 
of it are vital. If we want to know, however, when human life ends – and not only 
whether or not there still is some ‘vitality’ in a human body, then the biological 
concept of life is not helpful. Therefore, the biological determination and use of 
these concepts do not lead to an adequate comprehensive concept of human death 
and do not provide any normative guidance as to how we should deal appropriately 
with brain-dead humans whose organs are in parts still functioning. 
Life and Death as Normative Concepts 
of a Human ‘Life-Form’ 
It seems as if ‘life’ and ‘death’ mean different things depending on whether they are 
used in the language-game of biology or in the context of the ‘Lebenswelt’, i.e. in 
the context of human actions and relationships. I will argue in the following that the 
concept of ‘life’ primarily refers to this context which I call the ‘practical’ context, 
because we lead a life in our ‘Lebenswelt’ and we always do this in a specific 
human ‘life-form’.24 Thus, if we want to know how human life is characterized, we 
have to explain the concept of human ‘life-form’. In this case, we must not abstract 
from the procedural character of life and we cannot simply transfer the experienced 
‘expressions of life’ into a list of criteria. Moreover, we have to consider the specific 
24 Plessner 2003 (1928).
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human conditions under which these expressions of life are performed. Referring 
to Cassirer and Kant, I will argue that it is not the property or ability of ‘having 
language’ that characterizes a human being, nor is it any specific property or 
ability. In fact, only the ‘practical’ use of such abilities, the practical use of symbols 
generates the ‘human life-form’ and turns mere vitality into human life; i.e. the use 
of language under the claims of morality and right at the same time. 
The ‘animal symbolicum’ – Cassirer’s formulation – is therefore not an ‘animal 
plus having language’ or ‘an animal plus the ability to speak or communicate’, but just 
marks the participation in interpersonal normative relationships and commitments. 
Hence, the ‘animal symbolicum’ is not another kind of animal. Rather, this term 
marks the participants of the specific ‘life-form’, a ‘life-form’ that can be performed 
due to the qualitative practical transformation.
All participants of this very ‘life-form’, the animalia symbolica, we can understand 
as a ‘person’ not because of certain (personal) skills and abilities (like language, 
thought, self-awareness and vitality) – these are merely necessary conditions for 
generating this human ‘life-form’. ‘Life-form’ itself does not analytically follow from 
these skills, but rather is the result of a practical act, i.e. a synthetic act that one has 
to perform voluntarily and intentionally. In addition, the human ‘life-form’ requires 
many of these acts. It demands that these acts be repeated through history 
and become manifest in interpersonal moral and juridical rules and laws. Within 
interpersonal relationships of the human ‘life-form’ the meaning of life assumes 
a different meaning than in the biological language-game. Lawful relationships of 
mutual commitment do not only distinguish the human ‘life-form’ from other ‘life-
forms’, but even establish the possibility of asking how the beginning and end of 
human life are reasonably determined. 
So the moral question of how we should deal with human beings who have or no 
longer have certain abilities is by no means answered by mere reference to these 
abilities. For this to be possible, it would be required that a decision had already 
been made which abilities a human being ought to have in order to be capable 
of being regarded as a participant in the human life-form – in short as a person. 
And an evaluative judgment would be needed defining which abilities should be 
reasons for us to treat a human being in a certain way – namely as a person. Only 
this normative judgment, substantiated by reasons, can provide information what it 
means that a human being is a person or should be treated as a person. 
The debate has been ongoing for many years in this connection both in 
theoretical and in practical philosophy. Of course, it is widely ramified and has 
already reached a high degree of differentiation. Therefore, I would merely like 
to suggest briefly which definition of the concept of a person I deem suitable for 
further dealing with the question of human death. Hopefully, I have succeeded in 
pointing out that their status as persons represents the reason why human beings 
should be treated in a certain way. Accordingly the further definition of the concept 
of a person can only be gathered within the context of a normative theory, i.e. 
as part of a critical reflection on already established moral and legal claims and 
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standards. Sure enough, in order to realize moral and legal claims we also need to 
possess certain abilities. However, these abilities then provide the physiological, 
psychological, or social ‘basis’ for the realization and do not as such legitimize the 
particular moral and legal claims – and thus equally do not legitimize the claim 
that we should regard and acknowledge human beings as persons. Regarding 
and acknowledging human beings as persons and participants of our human life-
form accordingly cannot be the same as examining and assessing whether they 
possess certain abilities. It rather means that we regard both others and ourselves 
as standing in moral and legal relations and that we should treat both others and 
ourselves in accordance with the claims prevailing in these relations. The concept 
of a person in my view expresses precisely this normative transformation of 
the human being as specimen of the species homo sapiens to a participant of 
the human life-form under the claim of moral and legal conditions.25 Whilst the 
expression ‘person’ is in the singular, its conceptual content suggests that this 
term stands for every individual specimen of the species and that all acts of every 
individual participant as well as all acts of this community from now on should 
be justified under the principles, according to which the concrete moral and legal 
relationships are constituted. The status of a person is a counterfactual status that is 
awarded by making recourse to ideal interpersonal systems, i.e. under normatively 
claimed moral and legal conditions. Looking at it from this perspective, the status 
of a person is ascribed entirely independently of concrete properties and abilities. 
So even if the particular participant in this community loses particular abilities, he 
or she still remains a person, continues to have certain rights, and stays under the 
protection of normative conditions. 
This understanding of the concept of a person, of course, differs from everyday 
speech and psychological usage. What is commonly referred to as a person in the 
colloquial sense are the character, properties, peculiarities, and abilities developed 
by a human being leading a life as a person. For the sake of avoiding confusions, 
it makes sense to designate this individual character of a concrete human life as 
‘personality’. The personality developed in each case – in contrast to the status 
of a person – can also be lost. Severe injuries and physiological or psychological 
disorders may lead to changes in or even to a loss of one’s own personality. However, 
because personalities are persons, because personalities develop within moral and 
legal communities, in which they also acquire importance and value for others, it is 
understandable that communities commit themselves to protecting the personality 
even beyond its loss. This is the case in most of our current communities, which 
provide for a so-called post mortem personality right and demand, for example, 
that the memory of the personality of a person be respected and protected. 
25 This line of thought does not necessarily end in a ‘speciesism’, but merely accommodates the 
circumstance that human beings under normal conditions develop the required skills and abilities 
to be able to enter moral and legal relationships and thus to mutually commit to each other. But this 
does not exclude putting other living beings or objects under legal protection also and awarding 
them the status of participants in this community – their rights and duties would then have to be 
determined according to their abilities. 
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In which respect can this understanding of person and personality now be helpful 
in determining human death? On the one hand, as a result of this understanding the 
normative search for an adequate criterion for human death would have to bear in 
mind that human beings as persons die and that they develop their personalities as 
persons and in communities with others. In comparison to this suggestion, referring 
merely to physiological parameters or biological feature ascriptions as a sufficient 
criterion for human death, only seems like a reduction. If it is correct that every 
criterion for human death is the result of a substantiated normative decision, then 
an adequate criterion in view of all justified claims including the other dimensions of 
human life must be justified with reference to these. Accordingly, it is also a decision 
that needs to be justified if the main emphasis in trying to answer the question 
of the end of human life is placed on the physiological and biological aspects. 
It becomes clear that the practical consequences also have to be regarded as 
part of the normative decision. Viewed in this light, the determination of the brain 
death criterion would also include the decision in favor of the dying in intensive 
medical care including the burdens entailed for all those involved. It must become 
accountable which consequences arise from the decision to give that much weight 
to the physiological basis of human life. Furthermore, it must be clear that these 
consequences are not the result of anonymous structures or a given nature, but 
rather the outcome of our evaluative judgment.
The Concept and Criterion of Death and Organ Removal
The question for the conditions under which the life of a human being has ended 
therefore cannot be answered by making immediate recourse to the state of the 
organism. To answer this question it first of all has to be decided what is meant 
by the expression human life, which significance is attached to the functionality of 
the human organism, i.e. biological vitality, and how much weight should be given 
to other aspects of human life, such as the emotional, intellectual, mental, and 
social dimension. Should we, for example, consider a human life to have ended 
when the organism of a human being is living in the biological sense, as set out 
in the above, but the abilities for realizing other dimensions of human life can no 
longer be sustained? Has human life ended when the sustainment of the organic 
functions causes all other dimensions of the life of a human being (the ability 
to communicate, social relationships, etc.) to be completely eliminated? Under 
these circumstances, may one demand that the functions of an organism be no 
longer supported or even be actively terminated if a human being has given these 
dimensions of his or her life a priority over the biological vitality? The determination 
of the end of human life in searching for an answer to all these questions calls for 
an evaluative judgment. The normative content of this judgment, of course, must 
be rendered explicitly, critically examined, and justified in each case. Considering 
human life to have ended with ‘brain death’ in this context is by no means a mere 
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statement about the failure of a certain integrative unit but rather an evaluative 
judgment. The irreversible failure of the brain therein is named as a reason that we 
should acknowledge when considering the life of a human being to have ended. 
Whether brain death actually should be this reason that justifies that we ascribe 
the predicate ‘dead’ (and then also treat the individual concerned as a dead 
person, stop any reanimation measures, explant, etc.) or whether it should be other 
states or circumstances that should be deemed to be such reasons, must equally 
be examined and legitimized. Such criticism and substantiation of legitimacy of 
reasons traditionally comes within the domain of ethics (in the sense of a critical 
reflection upon moral and legal standards). And here it must be reflected upon 
and re-discussed continuously depending on the changes in the concrete social 
circumstances. 
Consequently, the existence of brain-dead human beings confronts us with the 
normative question of whether we have reasons to regard human life under these 
conditions as having ended and whether we can justify brain death as an adequate 
criterion also of human death. This does not challenge the definition of death as the 
end of life, since the evaluative judgment precisely concerns those criteria, under 
which we should apply the definition of death as the end of life to human beings. 
So it is not the definition but the criteria that require an ethical justification in this 
case. The question of whether the irreversible failure of the brain should represent 
a reason to consider human life as having ended, or else the question which 
significance we should attach to the irreversible failure of the brain for human life, 
we must therefore determine and justify by making recourse to normative reasons 
within the context of ethics.26 
If these considerations are right, then even the irreversible loss of the brain 
that we currently use as a criterion for human death is a practical criterion. It 
singles out a certain phase in the process of dying and determines it as the border 
between life and death. Even if there might still be some vitality in the brain, this 
criterion assesses that this very individual human life has ‘now’ come to an end. 
Certainly, human life in this context refers to the individually performed life-history 
within interpersonal relationships of the human ‘life-form’. Moreover, against this 
background, it also means that all criteria for death (or life) discussed so far have to 
take into account that human beings live in communities; that they are emotionally 
connected with each other; that they care for each other; and finally that for this life 
the bodily existence of a person is both constitutive and formative.
Let us assume that these results are worth considering: What consequences 
would arise with regard to the question of how to deal appropriately with brain-dead 
donors of organs or human remains? First, we must infer that brain death is not 
the death of a person. A human being, even if it has no more so-called ‘personal’ 
26 Cf. Gehring 2012, 185–201. Even if Gehring very rightfully criticizes the stylization of death 
as an act of deciding and unmasks the individualization of this deciding as ideology, this does not 
change the fact that the concrete ascription of the predicate “dead” is a normative act that requires 
a justification. 
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abilities, is still acknowledged as a person and therefore part of the interpersonal 
relationships of the human ‘life-form’. 
Thus, persons, even if brain-dead, are protected by rights and deserve to be 
treated with respect. Certainly, they cannot claim these rights for themselves but 
their relatives can. And the relatives themselves have a right to be acknowledged 
in this role and in their outstanding relationship to the dying or even to the dead 
person. Due to the interpersonal dimension of the human ‘life-form’, rules that 
include the vote of the relatives (such as the ‘extended consent solution’) are the 
only kinds of appropriate solutions. They are appropriate simply because they 
offer the opportunity that people who were connected to the life-history of the 
dying person or the dead can decide and can adjust their decision to the very 
circumstances of the peculiar situation (for instance the individual dead person or 
the family situation) – which the person in question might not have been able to 
anticipate.  
Finally, I would like to briefly consider whether the DDR should be retained in 
the future. What strikes me as problematic about the DDR is that it implies – at 
least in terms of language – the suggestion that death in connection with organ 
transplantation is a purely natural event, which has to first be awaited or ascertained 
by those involved. Only then, as is suggested by the DDR, a decision is to be made 
concerning the morally valid question whether or not the organs of this human 
being should be explanted. However, the ascription of the predicate ‘dead’ is by no 
means normatively neutral, but represents a central moment in finding an answer 
in the ethical debate and justification of organ removal. This very fact, though, 
in my view is not reflected in the clear, but simple version of the DDR. Rather, 
the DDR lends itself to simplifications that may also be used for obscuring this 
complex circumstance.27 It is true that the ‘brain death criterion’, to which the DDR 
is currently still linked, because of its tense relation to the phenomenal impressions 
and its artificial nature, as I see it, can by any means be identified as a normative 
setting. Speaking of a criterion already indicates on the level of language that it is 
a question of determining a point in the process of dying, or dying off of the various 
integrative units, from which certain acts may be performed or must be refrained 
from. What also appears problematic, though, in this connection is the usage of 
death and the prevalent equation (‘Brain death is death’)28, insofar as the normative 
nature of the term is revoked. This could possibly be avoided by referring to brain 
death as a ‘removal criterion’ and by proceeding to abandon the DDR. In this case, 
the absurdity in terms of language involved with the multiplication of modes of 
death (brain death, cardiac death, etc.) could be dispelled. For this to happen, of 
course, one would have to recognize that not only our expressions of language 
27 Currently one comes across such simplifications of the issue, which in my view prevent 
awareness, in particular in some of the international campaigns for the promotion of organ donation. 
Cf. for instance the campaign: C’mon. Don’t be a jerk. You know that’s not we’re talking about. You’ll 
be dead. It won’t hurt (https://twitter.com/LiveToFightCF) (visited 18 September 2013).
28 Cf. Angstwurm 2003, 291–297.
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but also the underlying concepts do not always and under all circumstances mean 
the same and the precision with which they mean something may and must vary 
depending on the context. In some conditions, which again can be determined, of 
course, the meaning of the concept of human death, for instance, proves vague. 
In other conditions its meaning seems to be entirely sufficiently determined. For 
example, certain situations of acting in the medical or legal context require that 
an exact time of death is determined.29 For this purpose the end of life must then 
be defined in further conceptual differentiation and criteria that are as clear cut as 
possible, such as failure of the complete brain functions. Correspondingly operable 
measuring methods need to be developed. As far as ‘common’ dying is concerned, 
though, one can get by with traditional death criteria. The vagueness ensuing from 
the processuality of dying in this context – at least up to now – does not yet pose 
a problem that would interfere with the orientation of our acting. In both cases 
mentioned as well as in all other possible cases, the fact remains: death is the end 
of life. 
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